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Heart Transplants: Legal Problems and
the Need for New Legislation
IN RECENT MONTHS, medical science has begun to develop a new
surgical technique, the heart transplant, which, if completely
effective, will prolong the life of the terminal heart patient.1 In-
cluding the first transplant by South Africa's Dr. Christiaan Bar-
nard, 21 transplants have been attempted thus far. Of the first five
recipients of transferred hearts, only one, Dr. Philip Blaiberg, who
was Dr. Barnard's second patient, has survived.2  While the ques-
tion of the moral and ethical considerations of experimentation on
human beings is thus raised, it will be sufficient for the purposes
of this Note to acknowledge the fact that the surgeons who per-
I The new technique has brought particular recognition to the doctors involved. Dr.
Christiaan Barnard, the South African surgeon who performed the first human heart
transplant operation, graced the cover of a national news magazine, TRME, Dec. 15, 1967,
and a few days later was the guest of honor on a television news program which dealt
with some of the legal and moral issues raised by that operation. NBC News Special,
A Conversation with Dr. Christiaan Barnard, Dec. 31, 1967 [hereinafter cited as NBC
Special, transcript). Dr. James Hardy of the University of Mississippi had once at-
tempted a transplant of a chimpanzee's heart into a man, but the attempt failed after the
passage of less than 2 hours. TIME, Dec. 15, 1967, at 71; NEWSWEEK, Dec. 18, 1967,
at 89. Dr. Barnard was thus the first to transplant a heart from one human to another.
2 Lear, A Realistic Look at Heart Transplants, SATURDAY REV., Feb. 3, 1968, at 57.
Dr. Barnard's first patient, Louis Washkansky, received the heart of a young woman
killed in an automobile accident Dr. Barnard's overnight fame was scarcely tarnished
by Washkansky's death just 18 days later. J.A.M.A., Jan. 8, 1968, at 37; T!ME, Dec.
29, 1967, at 32. The second transplant was performed by Dr. Adrian Kantrowitz in
Brooklyn, New York. His patient, an infant, died only 6V2 hours after receiving an-
other infant's heart. TImE, Dec. 15, 1967, at 65-66. Dr. Kantrowitz's failure in that
case and in his second attempt have been almost overlooked because of the publicity at-
tending the other three relatively successful operations. This attempt failed because the
donated heart was too small, and caused Dr. Moses Tendler of Yeshiva College's biology
department to criticize Kantrowitz for making the attempt. N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1968,
at 47, col. 4.
California's Dr. Norman Shumway, who had announced that medical science was
ready to attempt a heart transplant even before Dr. Barnard operated on Washkansky,
became the third surgeon to attempt the feat when he replaced Mike Kasperak's heart
with the heart of a woman who had died of a brain hemmorhage. Lear, supra at 56-57.
Kasperak survived for 16 days and was the subject of a fantastic variety of medical pro-
cedures and surgical operations before he succumbed. Id.
The operation performed on Dr. Blaiberg is important in two additional respects:
Not only did the transplanted heart start immediately without stimulation, but Dr. Blai-
berg was a white South African whose life was prolonged by the heart of a "colored"
donor. TIME, Jan. 12, 1968, at 38. A "colored" person in South Africa is not a true
Negro but is of mixed ancestry. Id. Dr. Barnard claims that Negro Africans make
better donors because they are less prone to coronary disease. He has also stated that
interracial transplants raise no political problems in South Africa. NBC Special, tran-
script at 4-5. For another interesting discussion of legal problems in transplantation,
see Note, Legal Problems in Donations of Human Tissues to Medical Science, 21 VAND.
L REV. 352 (1968).
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formed these operations did so only after a considerable amount of
research had been conducted, including the development of other
cardiac surgery techniques,' experimental research with dogs,4 and
the experience of surgeons in renal transplants.' This article will
explore the complex legal problems confronted by the transplant
donor, donee, and surgeon, while illustrating the need for new
and comprehensive legislation to alleviate many of the problems.
Some solutions will also be proposed. Although many of the issues
and approaches are unique to cardiac transplants, some analogous
situations which have arisen in the context of renal transplantation
will be referred to on appropriate occasions.
I. THE GIVER OF LIFE
A. The Legal Means of Donating a Heart
A dead body has often been considered the property of the de-
ceased's family, or at least the family traditionally has been said to
have a quasi-property right to have the body buried and the remains
preserved.' Some form of authorization has therefore been neces-
sary for removal of organs or for use of the body or its parts. Many
jurisdictions have statutes which prohibit dissection or autopsy with-
out prior authorization by either the deceased,7 or by his next of
kin after his death.8 Civil liability is often imposed for unauthor-
ized removal of organs. For these reasons, organ transplantation
3 Over many years, heart surgeons developed the heart-lung machine to keep patients
alive during heart surgery, learned to replace or repair blood vessels, created artificial
heart valves, made use of new antibiotics, and invented the electrical pacemaker. These
techniques are now almost routinely employed. See H. ScHMEcK, THE SEM-ARTiFic-
IAL MAN 68-89 (1965).
4 Dr. Shumway was very active in research with dogs and published several papers
on his work. Dr. Barnard also experimented with animals but did not publish his results.
Lear, supra note 2, at 56.
5 See H. SCHMECK, supra note 3, at 19-43.
6 See 25A C.J.S. Dead Bodies § 2 (1966), and cases cited therein. One court stated:
There is no strict property in a corpse.... But the law has always given
it great consideration. The right to possess, preserve, and bury it belongs in
the absence of testamentary direction to the surviving spouse if there is one,
and if not to the next of kin, who may maintain an action for a deprivation
of the right of sepulture or a mutilation of the body. Travelers Ins. Co. v.
Welch, 82 F.2d 799, 801 (5th Cir. 1936).
" For example, according to the law of New York: "A person who makes, or causes
or procures to be made, any dissection of the body of a human being, except by authority
of law, or in pursuance of a permission given by the deceased, is guilty of a misde-
meanor." N.Y. PEN. LAW § 2214 (McKinney 1967).
8 E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7113, 7115 (West Supp. 1967).
9 Liability has been imposed for any unauthorized or negligent multilation of the
body. See 25A C.J.S. Dead Bodies § 8(3) (a) (1966), and cases cited therein.
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is unlikely to flourish in any jurisdiction which lacks legislation
delineating the steps a donor must take to leave his body, or a part
of it, to medical science.1"
Probably because of the popular recognition of kidney and cor-
neal transplants, many forward-looking State legislatures have re-
cently enacted statutes prescribing how and by whom a body or an
organ may be donated." The prerequisites for donation are gen-
erally similar to the requirements governing the execution of a will.
Thus, the donor may provide for the disposition of his body or a
part of it, if he has legal capacity, 2 by a written instrument. This
will or separate instrument must be attested to by two witnesses.' 4
In some cases the instrument must specify the use to which the
organ will be put, or if such specification is absent, the donee or
hospital may make this decision. Some statutes provide for general
authorization for use of the body or organ to advance medical sci-
ence, education, or for replacement or rehabilitation of diseased or
wornout organs.'5 The donee may be named in the instrument.
If no donee is named, the statutes generally permit the hospital,
attending physician, or State board of health to be considered the
donee."0 The authorizing instrument must sometimes be filed with
'
0 Wasmuth, Legal Aspects of Organ Transplantation, 46 ANESTHESIA & ANAL-
GESIA 25 (1967).
11E.g,, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-408 (1960); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 55
7113, 7115 (West Supp. 1967); CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 91-3-9 (1964); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-139c (Supp. 1966); IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-510 (Supp. 1967);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 311.352-.354 (1963); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:2351-55
(1963); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 14.523(1)-(7) (Supp. 1968); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§
12-11-1 to -5 (Supp. 1967); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-216.1-.4 (1965); OHIo REv.
CODE ANN. § 2108.01 (Page 1967 Current Service); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§
105-08 (1964); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 5001-03 (1964); TENN. CODE ANN. §§
32-601 to -08 (Supp. 1967); TKx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590-1 (1960), as
amended (Supp. 1967); WASH. REV. CODE AN. §§ 68.08.250-.280 (1962); Wis.
STAT. ANN. 155.06 (Supp. 1967). A more comprehensive list of State statutes relating
to donation may be found in Note, supra note 2, at 359 n.44.
12 For example, Michigan requires that the donor be of "full age and sound mind."
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.523(1) (Supp. 1968). Ohio requires that the donor be over
21 and of sound mind. OHIO REV, CODE ANN. § 2108.01 (Page 1967 Current Service).
Wisconsin requires that the donor be age 21 and of sound mind. WIs. STAT. ANN. 5
155.06 (Supp. 1967).
13 E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7113 (West Supp. 1967); IND. ANN.
STAT. § 6-510 (Supp. 1967); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. 5 2108.01 (Page 1967 Current
Service); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art 4590-1, §§ 1-2 (Supp. 1967).
14 E.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-511 (Supp. 1967) (two witnesses necessary for non-
testamentary disposition); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2108.01 (Page 1967 Current Ser-
vice); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 155.06 (Supp. 1967).
15 E.g., MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 14.523 (1) (Supp. 1968); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.
art. 4590-1, § 2 (Supp. 1967); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 68.08.250 (1962).
16E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.02 (Page 1967 Current Service); TEx. REV.
19683
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the donee hospital or physician." Revocation may be made by a
subsequent instrument which in some cases must be delivered to
the stated donee."8 If all requirements are met, State law generally
absolves the donee from liability. 9 Some problems arise, however,
in those jurisdictions which do not permit removal of the organ
until after the funeral rites,2" since a heart can survive for only a
short time after death. Ohio, which follows the wills analogy
scheme, has taken this problem into consideration."
Many of the jurisdictions that treat the body of a deceased per-
son as property have provided for the bequest of organs in a man-
ner similar to that provided for chattels and have accordingly
amended their wills statutes." This type of legislation may be a
CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590-1, § 2 (Supp. 1967); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 68.08.250
(1962).
1 7 E.g., MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 14.523(3) (Supp. 1968); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 68.08.250 (1962).
1s E.g., Oxio REv. CODE ANN. § 2108.01 (Page 1967 Current Service); TEX. REv.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590-1, 5 2 (Supp. 1967); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 68.08.250
(1962).
1 9 E.g., MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 14.523(6) (Supp. 1968); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2108.03 (Page 1967 Current Service); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art 4590-1, § 2
(Supp. 1967); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 68-08.250 (1962).
2 0 E.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.523 (4) (Supp. 1968); see text accompanying note
53 infra.
21 Ohio's recent legislation provides a good example of a comprehensive statute.
Section 2108.01 of the Ohio Revised Code permits a person of sound mind who is over
the age of 21 to make a gift of all or any part of his body by a written instrument signed
by the donor which becomes effective on his death. It requires attestation by two wit-
nesses who have no affiliation with the donee or donee institution. The instrument is
effective without delivery or acceptance and may be revoked in the manner by which
the instrument was executed. The problem of funeral services is alleviated in the case
of transplants since the next of kin may make funeral arrangements before the body is
claimed by the donee only if the entire body has been donated. The problem of family
conflict is also alleviated since the rights of a donee or his agent are superior to those of
the donor's spouse, relatives, guardian, or others - subject to limitations in the instru-
ment. If only a gift of an organ is made, custody of the body is transferred to the next
of kin immediately after removal.
Section 2108.02 of the Ohio Revised Code expressly permits the naming of certain
types of donees. For transplant purposes, the most important are: a named individual;
a licensed physician, surgeon, or hospital; nonprofit blood banks, artery banks, eye banks,
or other storage facilities for human parts to be used in therapy or transplantation. The
statute also provides that if the donor provides for donation to a specified donee, but
this transplantation proves unfeasible, removal for transplantation is permitted for the
benefit of any person by a licensed physician or surgeon, who is the alternative donee
for the originally designated donee.
Finally, section 2108.03 exempts from civil liability any person who acts in good
faith while relying on the authorization of the above provisions if such person has no
knowledge of a revocation. Also absolved from liability is any person who unknowingly
fails to execute the donor's wishes.
22 Compare IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-510 (Supp. 1967) (changing the law of wills in
Indiana to permit bequest by the body or its parts), with CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
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logical modification of the common law theory that the next of kin
has a quasi-property right in the body for the purpose of burial.
This approach is objectionable from a moral standpoint since it
tends to degrade the human body to the level of a mere machine
with interchangeable parts.23 Other States have chosen the prefer-
able course of amending their health laws to allow a donor or his
next of kin to dispose of the body or organs by a gift for medical
use.
25
Some jurisdictions have statutes which specifically permit the
surviving spouse or the next of kin of a deceased person to donate
the body or organs, even if the deceased has not executed a formal
document expressing his intent to make the gift.26 Such a provi-
sion is necessary if heart transplants are to be successful because the
time element is more crucial in heart transplant cases than in kidney
transplants.2 No mechanical heart is as effective as the artificial
kidney, and the techniques of preserving and storing hearts are not
as well developed as those for kidneys." In addition, prospective
heart donors are often dead or comatose, so that such donors can-
not give consent for the necessary removal operation.2" Therefore,
§§ 7113, 7115 (West Supp. 1967) (changing the California law governing consent to
autopsies to permit donation of organs).
2 3 A Nobel Prize-winning geneticist has been quoted as saying that the immune re-
action barrier has prevented the dehumanization of the body and that when that barrier
falls the personality of the body will be jeopardized. H. S CHMEcK, supra note 3, at 200.
The property approach may also make it conceptually more difficult for a jurisdiction
to permit donation by the next of kin since the deceased has the right to dispose of the
body by his will but the surviving spouse and next of kin have only the quasi-property
right to burial. See 33 N.C.L. REv. 653, 655 (1955). It would seem that even in
those States, a new property right in the surviving spouse or next of kin for purposes
of donation of the body or organs could be recognized. There are numerous jurisdictions
which do not take the property approach and do not specifically permit donation by the
surviving spouse or next of kin. E.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-139c (Supp.
1966); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, 55 105-08 (1964); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 5001-
03 (1964).
24 E.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 311.352 (1963); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-11-1
(Supp. 1967).
2 5 E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7113, 7115 (West Supp. 1967); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.354 (1963); WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. § 68.08.260 (1962).
2 6E.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 68.08.260 (1962).
2 7J.A..AL., Nov. 20, 1967, at 31.
28 Id.
2 9 Kidney donations do not pose this problem since the donors are not in danger
of death and generally survive after the removal of one kidney. Wasmuth, supra note
10, at 25. While some transplant statutes are similar to will statutes, kidney transplants
would seem to be more appropriately analogous to inter vivos gifts since kidney donors
usually live after the removal of one kidney. The proposed Uniform Anatomical Gift
Act provides for donation by next of kin unless the decedent has expressed a contrary
wish. Note, supra note 2, at 364-66.
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without statutory provision for donation by someone other than the
donor himself, few hearts will be available for transplantation.
None of the recent transplants involved an instrument executed by
the donor." Dr. Barnard accepted the heart for his second opera-
tion without the consent of the donor's wife, although the donor's
mother did consent." Dr. Shumway was more careful in the Kas-
perak case as evidenced by the consent he obtained from the donor's
husband and both of her children.32 Perhaps Dr. Shumway's cau-
tion is explained by the traditional conservatism of the American
medical profession in making decisions having legal consequences,
since the consent of either the husband or either child, if he was
not a minor, would have sufficed under the California statute.33
It is not clear whether the next of kin of a deceased donor could
block the removal of an organ bequeathed to medical science by a
valid instrument. 4 Presumably, if the next of kin were opposed
to such a disposition they could seek an injunction relying on their
common law quasi-property right to the body.3 5 Some statutes
have eliminated this problem by providing specifically that the
next of kin must cooperate with the donee.3 6 Although it seems
clear that the donor's expressed intent should prevail, statutory
clarification is desirable because the lack of cooperation by the next
of kin would make a transplant impossible due to the delay and
would thus defeat the donor's purpose.
Another problem may arise from the execution of a donative
instrument by a person who has no authority to do so. The statutes
30 Lear, supra note 2, at 56.
31 TIME, Jan. 12, 1968, at 38. In cases like this, one wonders whether consent of
the next of kin so soon after the donor's death should be permitted because of the be-
reaved person's emotional state.
32 Lear, supra note 2, at 56.
33 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7113, 7115 (West Supp. 1967).
3 4 Wasmuth, supra note 10, at 25.
35 See text accompanying note 23 supra. They will be able to argue that the donor
lacked the capacity to make a valid instrument if it was executed shortly before his death.
Wasmuth, supra note 10, at 25; see note 12 supra and accompanying text. A rule of law
might be developed which would invalidate the donor's instrument if executed too close
to the time of death. Cf. T. ATKINsON, WILLS § 35 (1953). Mortmain statutes are
generally enacted to prevent undue influence being placed on the deceased to donate his
property to charity just prior to the time of his death. It seems that there is more reason
for restricting gifts of "property" to charity than for limiting gifts of organs, since the
latter do not financially injure the next of kin.
36 E.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-139c (Supp. 1966). In Tennessee the don-
or's spouse and next of kin, if they have actual knowledge of the donative instrument,
have no right to possession of the body until after removal of the organ. TENN. CODE
ANN. § 32-606 (Supp. 1967). Louisiana provides a criminal penalty for obstructing
the disposition prescribed by the instrument. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:2355 (1963).
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which permit the donation of organs by the donor's next of kin
generally resolve this problem by providing that a hospital or a
doctor who relies on an invalid instrument in good faith is absolved
from liability.
37
The problem of assuring that a donor's wishes are carried out
no matter where he dies, has prompted some suggestions of uni-
form or federal legislation to cover the cases where a donor dies
outside his home State. 8 Some proposals would create a universal
identification card or tag for donors.3" Of course, if the donor
designated the Cleveland Clinic as the donee of his heart but died
in Los Angeles, even a uniform or federal statute would probably
not make it possible for the Cleveland Clinic to obtain the heart in
usable condition because of the inadequacy of present preservation
techniques.4" Therefore, either the applicable statute or the donor's
instrument should provide that the hospital in which he dies or that
his attending physician is the alternative beneficiary.41
At present, there is a desperate shortage of both donated kid-
neys42 and hearts. It is likely that if heart transplantation continues
to progress rapidly the shortage of hearts will be even more extreme
because of the obvious impossibility for donors to give their hearts
and yet continue to live as kidney donors often do.43 Thus, at least
initially, heart transplants will probably be less numerous than
kidney transplants.44 Even so, new legislation to facilitate dona-
tion is vital to prevent a critical shortage of transplantable hearts.
3 7 E.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-512 (Supp. 1967); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-608
(Supp. 1967); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 155.06 (Supp. 1967).
38J.A.M.A., Jan. 8, 1968, at 31. Conflicts of laws problems may occur unless fed-
eral legislation is enacted. Note, supra note 2, at 366-68.
39 J.A.M.A., Jan. 8, 1968, at 38.
40 Id., Nov. 20, 1967, at 31.
41 Some statutes so provide if no beneficiary is designated. E.g., TEX. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art 4590-1 (Supp. 1967); WAsh. REV. CODE ANN. § 68.08.280 (1962).
42 NEwSWBEK, Dec. 18, 1967, at 90. Currently, only one-seventh of the patients
who could be treated by hemodialysis or renal transplantation are receiving such treat-
ment. J.A.M.A., Nov. 20, 1967, at 29.
4 3 Dr. Kantrowitz cites the fact that about 400,000 Americans will die this year of
heart attacks and he doubts that an equal number of donors can be found. NEWswEEr,
Dec. 18, 1967, at 90.
4 4 Shortages of funds, facilities, and transplant surgeons will be very serious in the
next few years. Dr. Barnard estimates that only about 1 percent of the patients who
need such an operation will get it. NBC Special, transcript at 2. To improve present
methods of storage of donated hearts, Dr. Barnard suggests either (1) the use of a sys-
tem which supplies nourishment to the heart and which lowers the rate of heartbeat or
(2) storage in another animal. The latter has been done with kidneys. Id. at 3.
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B. The Time of the Donor's Death
Obviously a heart donor would be unlikely to permit his heart
to be taken from him until his death. This, combined with the
necessity for speed in removing the donor's heart and placing it in
the recipient, necessitates a definite standard which comports with
modern medical knowledge for fixing the time of death. The law
has thus far failed to provide such a standard.45  "Death" is com-
monly defined legally as the "cessation of life,"46 a definition which
is tautologous.
In an effort to be more precise, a California court has defined
death as the point at which "the heart stops beating and respiration
ends."47  Several medical authorities have argued that the cardio-
respiratory test fixes the time of legal death too late in many cases.4s
They assert that "brain death" often occurs before the cardiorespira-
tory system is restarted by the resuscitation devices which are now
in general use.4" "Brain death" is described by one physician as
follows:
When there is extensive brain damage, the dying nervous sys-
tem disintegrates by steps and the person dies in stages. First
there occurs "clinical or medical death" at which moment spon-
taneous respiration and circulation cease. "Biological death," or
permanent extinction of life, quickly follows unless reanimation
procedures are started. If this is done, the brain may be stimu-
lated to function for a time. Nevertheless, at this stage, the pa-
tient is immobile with atonic muscles. There are no reflexes.
There is no reaction to pain. All vegetative regulations, such as
body temperature, cease. Only the heart continues to function.
An electroencephalographic (EEG) tracing is totally flat and this
many physicians believe justifies the conclusion that the central
nervous system is dead. 50
Dr. Barnard is a firm believer in the "brain death" theory. He has
stated that South African law requires the conjunction of three fac-
tors to constitute death: (1) lack of reflexes for a certain period;
(2) lack of spontaneous respiration for a certain period; and (3)
45 Wasmuth, supra note 10, at 25; Ayd, When is a Person Dead?, MEDICAL Sd.,
Apr. 1967, at 33-34.
4 6 BLACp'S LAW DicrioNARY 488 (4th ed. 1951); STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTION-
ARY 412 (2d Lawyers' ed. 1966).
47 Id. The definition was approved by the court in Thomas v. Anderson, 96 Cal.
App. 2d 371, 376, 215 P.2d 478, 482 (1950). See also BLAcK'S LAW DICTIONARY
488 (4th ed. 1951).
4 8 E.g., Fletcher, Prolonging Life, 42 WAsg. L. REv. 999, 1001 (1967); Ayd, supra
note 45, at 35.
40 Ayd, supra note 45, at 35.
5o Id.
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no electrical activity of heartbeat. According to Dr. Barnard, if
any one of these factors is present, the patient is medically, even if
not legally, dead. " Heart transplant surgeons naturally would like
to establish the medical death of the donor at the earliest ascertain-
able time because after heartbeat and respiration ceases, anoxia rap-
idly sets in and permanently damages the heart.52 If the heart is
to be in transplantable condition, no more than hour can pass
between heart stoppage and removal.53 According to Dr. Shum-
way, the fact that the heart will work outside the body does not
indicate that it should not have been taken from the donor's body
because "the period between death and removal of the heart en-
compasses the onset of irreversible brain damage in the donor."'
Thus, even if cardiorespiratory stoppage occurs before brain failure,
the brain function will cease before the heart can be removed.
To stimulate heart transplantation, a State could legislate a
time-of-death standard which is based on the criterion of "brain
death." The argument that once the brain has ceased to function
the patient is no longer a person but a mere vegetable being kept
"alive" by resuscitative measures is persuasive.55  It has been argued
that the physician is under no duty to use extraordinary efforts to
keep the patient alive when death is near and inevitable." This
theory would seem to permit the attending physician to stop re-
suscitation whenever it became an "extraordinary effort" as, for
example, when brain function had ceased for a considerable period.
Thus, the attending physician, after "brain death" had occurred,
would be able to set the time when the heart could be removed.5"
The "brain death" problem will require careful evaluation by
legislators, but it must be confronted if heart transplantation is to
be legally regulated.
H. LONG LIvE THE PATIENT
A. Selection of the Recipient
The medical decision that a patient should receive a heart trans-
51 NBC Special, transcript at 23.
52 J.MA.., Nov. 20, 1967, at 31.
53 Id. This causes additional complications where the statute permits removal only
after the funeral service.
54 J.A.M.A., Nov. 20, 1967, at 32.
55 See Ayd, supra note 45, at 35; J.A.M.A., Oct. 12, 1964, at 120. The proposed
Uniform Act makes no attempt to define time of death. Note, Legal Problems in Do-
nation of Human Tissues to Medical Science, 21 VAm. L. REv. 352, 371 (1968).
56 Ayd, supra note 45, at 34; Fletcher, supra note 48.
5 7 Wasmuth, supra note 10, at 27.
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plant is a complex and difficult one according to Dr. Shumway,5s
whose experience with Mike Kasperak amply illustrates the prob-
lem. Since there is a shortage of donors, there is a need to develop
rational, systematic ways of choosing one patient over another."9
The decision as to who needs a transplant and who would have
a reasonable chance of survival with a new heart should turn on
medical factors. Doctors bear a heavy responsibility here since it
is nearly impossible to legislate standards or to have a court decide
such questions, except in cases in which medical discretion is abused.
There are other criteria, such as ability to pay, and the person's
value to the community, which are not medical questions but which
may be decided by transplant surgeons. Policymakers would do
well to consider the approach taken in the selection of kidney re-
cipients in Seattle, Washington. There, a seven-man committee of
laymen has been established to weigh the nonmedical factors in
patient selection. The committee makes its choices on the basis of
objective facts about each prospective patient and without meeting
any of them personally."° Such a plan injects community values
into the selection process much as the jury injects community values
into a criminal trial. It should be noted, however, that because
heart transplantation is an emergency procedure at present,6 the
committee plan is not yet feasible.
Under any plan, there remains the danger that some influential
or wealthy patients will be able to force their way to the head of
the line. This may already have been attempted with Dr. Bar-
nard. 2 To alleviate this problem, kidney transplants have been
performed without charge to the patient, 3 but no system can com-
pletely eliminate the financial factor." Of course, a State might
58 J.A.M.A., Nov. 20, 1967, at 31.
59 For a good discussion of this problem, see H. ScHMEcK, THE SEMI-ARTIFICIAL
MAN 44-58 (1965).
6O Id. However, it may be argued that the committee should allow a patient a right
to be heard to ensure that its decisions are fair. Under the proposed Uniform Act, the
decision as to who should receive the heart is left to the doctors. Note, supra note 55,
at 373.
61J.A.M.A., Nov. 20, 1967, at 31.
62 See Lear, A Realistic Look at Heart Transplants, SATURDAY REV., Feb. 3, 1968,
at 53-54.
63 This was the decision made by the Seattle committee. H. SCsMEcK, supra note
59, at 47. At least one case has been reported where a person with the finances neces-
sary to pay the cost of the treatment has been unable to buy it anywhere. Id. at 63.
64 Dr. Barnard works on a salary in a hospital which does not charge the patients.
He admits that the patients who are wealthy probably will be better able to secure the
best medical care, but he argues that heart transplants are really no different from any
other medical advance and that the availability of the treatment to low income people is
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simply underwrite the cost of all transplants performed within its
jurisdiction and prohibit contributions to the hospital or surgeon by
the patient or his near relatives. The cost might not be too great
until the operations became very common, but doctors would prob-
ably fear State control of patient selection under such a plan. An-
other possible answer could be legislation which would add cover-
age for transplant surgery to each person's hospitalization insurance
at a modest cost, thus spreading the cost over a broad base. An
insured individual would thus get a transplant, in the event he
needed one, without additional cost.
B. Will Consent to the Operation Sufficiently Protect
the Donee?
It is extremely difficult for the transplant surgeon to evaluate
the likelihood that the technique will offer a more favorable prog-
nosis than some more conventional treatment, and it is even more
difficult to explain the risks to the patient or his relatives. 5 The
consent of the patient must be "informed," that is, it must be given
after he or his relatives have been apprised of the risks of the medi-
cal procedure,"8 and the duty to inform is even more stringent
where the procedure is new or experimental."1 The law, however,
should recognize that there may be medical reasons for withhold-
ing some information from a patient." Even the most liberal view
would require the surgeon to make the "disclosures which a rea-
really no more limited than that of any other type of surgery. NBC Special, transcript
at 17.
When heart preservation techniques become improved, potential donees may attempt
to financially induce donors to execute instruments of donation. In fact, because of the
scarcity of hearts and their possible economic value, relatives may fight the estate for the
"property" so that they can sell the donor's heart themselves. Even creditors might seek
to obtain a heart as property or proceeds from the sale thereof in satisfaction of a debt.
This could produce trust, estate, and other problems.
15 Lear, supra note 62, at 53; Page, Instant Reporting - Is It Necessary?, SATURDAY
REv., Feb. 3, 1968, at 58; Note, Experimentation on Huaan Beings, 20 STAN. L. REV.
99, 102-07 (1967).
G0 A good case illustrating the informed consent doctrine is Natanson v. Kline, 187
Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960). The court there held that the physician's duty to in-
form his patient of the risks inherent in cobalt radiation treatments of breast cancer was
absolute and that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to present expert testimony to
show that such nondisclosure of risks was contrary to accepted medical practice. Other
recent cases are collected and discussed in 18 W. RES. L. REv. 1018 (1967).
07 An eminent Cleveland anesthesiologist who is also an attorney has stated that:
"When the operation or method of treatment is new and experimental in nature, that
the physician not be negligent in his duty becomes more imperative.... The duty to
forewarn the patient and/or his family in this situation becomes absolute." Wasmuth,
"Informed Consent:" What Is It?, 46 ANESrHESIA & ANALGESIA 698, 701 (1967).
0 Id.; 18 W. RES. L. REv. 1018, 1022-23 (1967).
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sonable medical practitioner would make under the same or similar
circumstances." '69 Most courts examine what disclosures the physi-
cian made in obtaining consent and apply a test of reasonableness,"
but one court has gone so far as to require that the patient have
given his consent "with a true understanding of the nature of the
operation to be performed."71  A court hostile to heart transplanta-
tion might apply this stringent standard in weighing a patient's
consent to an operation. Such a rule is of dubious value because
of its stifling effect on medical progress. 2
Even if the transplant surgeon fully discloses all of the risks,
he must believe the operation necessary and-have confidence in his
ability to perform it successfully. He will, therefore, have an un-
conscious, or perhaps even conscious, tendency to "sell" the opera-
tion to the patient or his next of kin, especially where there is so
much for him to gain professionally and financially. For this rea-
son a scrupulously ethical transplant surgeon might delegate the
duty of obtaining consent to some member of his staff or to the
patient's own personal physician." This delegation should not in-
validate the patient's consent so long as the informing physician
was competent to provide the necessary information.74
With an experimental procedure such as heart transplantation,
even a strict informed consent rule may be insufficient to protect
the patient75 who may unwisely consent despite a complete apprisal
of the risks. For this reason, it has been suggested that a medical
committee be created to approve the application of experimental
techniques to patients.7" The committee would expertly and im-
partially evaluate the patient's need for a transplant and the prob-
ability of its success, weighing such factors as the ability and ex-
perience of the transplant team, the state of development of the
technique, and the patient's general physical condition. This pro-
69 Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 409, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106 (1960).
70 18 W. RES. L. REv. 1018, 1021 (1967).
71 Gray v. Grunnagle, 423 Pa. 144, 166, 223 A.2d 663, 674 (1966), quoting Powell,
Consent to Operation, 21 MD. L. REv. 189, 191 (1961).
72 18 W. RES. L. REV. 1018, 1023 (1967).
73 Dr. Shumway had nothing to do with getting Kasperak's consent. It was handled
by a member of his team and Kasperak's physician. Lear, supra note 62, at 56.
74 See text accompanying notes 65-73 supra.
75 Note, supra note 65, at 114.
76 Freund, Is the Law Ready for Human Experimentation?, 2 TRIAL 46, 48 (Oct.-
Nov. 1966); Note, supra note 65, at 108-09. The National Academy of Science's Board
on Medicine has proposed such a committee for heart transplants. N.Y. Times, Feb. 28,
1968, at 25, col. 1.
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cedure is probably too cumbersome for heart transplant cases, due
to the present necessity for speed, but perhaps such a committee
could be used to determine the qualifications to be met by a trans-
plant team before they would be permitted to operate.
Another possible means of protecting the patient would be the
use of a "monitor" physician who would be responsible for the wel-
fare of a patient but would have no other stake in the work of the
research team.7 This type of proposal could be implemented at
present either by legislation or by an ethical pronouncement of the
medical association. This would put considerable responsibility in
the patient's monitor physician. If the monitor was the donee's
personal physician, however, he might be unfamiliar with modern
surgical techniques and thus might, if he had the power, choose
more conventional treatment. In this respect the medical com-
mittee approach would be better because it could be composed of
experts.
The monitor approach might be used until the committee
method becomes feasible. Actually, by the time the screening com-
mittee becomes practical, the operative technique could be devel-
oped to the point where the decision whether to operate can be
worked out between the surgeon and the patient or his next of kin.
C. Should the Law Prescribe Tissue-Matching Standards?
The major factor hampering successful heart transplantation is
the physiological mechanism of the human body which both de-
fends a person against infection and causes the rejection of foreign
tissue.78  There are two ways to prevent the patient's rejection of
the new organ because of an immune reaction: (1) by careful
matching of the tissues in the organ being donated with the tissues
in the organ being replaced, " and (2) by the use of immunosup-
pressive drugs.8"
Since the speed demanded by a kidney transplant is not as great
as in the case of a heart transplant, there is more time for doctors
to perform the tests and to wait for a "matching" donated kidney.
Even with the added time to undertake tests of histocompatibiity,
kidney transplants are frequently performed, often successfully,
7 7 Guttentag, The Problem of Experimentation on Human Beings: The Physician's
Point of View, 117 Sc. 205, 207-10 (1953); Note, supra note 65.
78H. SCMMcIC, supra note 59, at 112.
79 Id. at 124-30.
8 0 Radiation has also been used to suppress the reaction. Id. at 120-24.
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without tests.81 Of course, kidneys are frequently donated by living
donors closely related to the recipient, which minimizes the chance
that the tissues will not match. 2 Further, kidney patients are prob-
ably able to stand much larger doses of immunosuppressive drugs
than heart patients, according to Dr. Shumway. Dr. Barnard has
admitted that Louis Washkansky died of "pneumonia possibly com-
plicated by immuno-suppresive therapy"83 which might have de-
stroyed the defenses which his body would have employed to fight
off the virus.84
Heart transplant surgeons are faced with a dilemma. They
have little or no time to perform histocompatibility tests on the
two hearts, yet are aware that the use of massive doses of immuno-
suppressive drugs may substantially weaken the resistance of the
heart patient to infectious complications.85 Perhaps under these
circumstances heart transplant surgery on human beings should
simply be prohibited, at least temporarily, because the small likeli-
hood of success does not justify the risk that the patient's life will
actually be shortened due to the operation. Likewise, unsuccessful
heart transplant surgery may raise false hopes and cause a great
degree of suffering and grief to the next of kin.8" To prohibit
81 Cf. J.A.M.A., Jan. 8, 1968, at 31, 32, 38. On the other hand, four early kidney
transplant donees developed terminal cancer from organs taken from donors afflicted
with cancer. One, however, survived which may prove that the "body's immunological
processes may cast out cancerous tissue in the same way that they reject any transplanted
tissues when immunosuppressive drugs are not used." TIME, Mar. 8, 1968, at 53, 54.
This may have implications for heart transplants.
82 H. SCHMECK, supra note 59, at 143.
83 J.A.M.A., Jan. 8, 1968, at 37.
84 Id.
85 It is interesting to note the differences in the way the immunosuppressive drugs
were used by Dr. Barnard and Dr. Shumway. Dr. Baruard used massive doses of drugs
on Washkansky to prevent rejection even before symptoms appeared. Dr. Shumway at-
tached an electrocardiograph electrode to Kasperak's heart and administered only a min-
imal dosage of drugs. He had learned the dangers of the drugs in his experiments with
dogs and had developed a method of using the electrocardiograph to alert him to rejec-
tion. He gave large doses of the drugs only after the symptoms appeared. Dr. Barnard
did not use the electrocardiograph system, but he did reduce the drug dosage in Dr. Blai-
berg's case. Lear, supra note 62, at 56-57.8 6 The National Academy of Sciences' Board on Medicine has urged restraint in per-
forming heart transplants. Dr. Walsh McDermott, the group's chairman, points out that
many surgeons have the skill required to perform the operation itself, but that few have
the range of knowledge or the research team necessary to accomplish a successful trans-
plant. N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1968, at 25, col. 1 (city ed.). Leaders of the American
College of Cardiologists have called for a 3- to 6-month moratorium on transplants to
allow the results of the first group of operations to be analyzed and assimilated. Cleve-
land Plain Dealer, Mar. 2, 1968, at 1, col. 5. The time may not yet have arrived when
heart transplantation should be sanctioned and encouraged by the law. Lear, supra note
62, at 57.
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heart transplantation altogether would undoubtedly delay the suc-
cessful development of the transplant technique. Such a decision
should yield to proposals to limit the number of these operations to
those which have reasonable prospects of success.
One such proposal is that histocompatibility standards be pre-
scribed by law. There are two major objections to this idea. First,
there is the time problem which has been mentioned. 7 Second,
the weight of medical opinion seems to be that no standard could
or should be set because the technique is new and there is a need
for flexibility to permit development."
Given the emergency nature of heart transplantation, it would
seem that unless it is found necessary to stop such operations alto-
gether, no histocompatibility standards should be set by law. Ei-
ther the medical screening committee or the monitor can expertly
consider the histocompatibility problems in deciding what is in the
best interest of the patient.8" This type of solution will permit
needed flexibility, since if histocompatibility data is available and
favorable, the prognosis will be improved. Further, the committee
or monitor would be more likely to permit the transplant if the
surgeon had worked out a system requiring small drug dosages or
if the patient were physically able to withstand large drug doses.
This plan requires a more objective evaluation of the need and pros-
pects for the operation without preventing the development of the
technique for the benefit of all heart patients.
D. The Publicity Problem
Until heart transplants become quite common it is likely that
each such operation will be highly publicized. The publicity will
probably not harm the patient's chances of recovery since he can
be isolated from it if he or his doctor so desire. Indications are that
Dr. Blaiberg, rather than avoiding publicity, sought to profit finan-
cially from the media's greed for exclusive news coverage."
On the other hand, the publicity factor puts a great strain on
the families of the heart recipients and on the surgeon himself.91
8 7 See text accompanying note 81 supra.
8 8 JA LA., Jan. 8, 1967, at 31.
8 9 See notes 76-78 supra and accompanying text.
9 0 NEwws K, Jan. 15, 1968, at 49.
9 1 Dr. Barnard attempted to prevent the massive surge of publicity surrounding the
Washkansky operation but he fought a losing battle. He estimates that 16 of the 18
hours he is awake daily are spent handling the press and only two in treating patients.
NBC Special, transcript at 28-31.
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Dr. Barnard feels that the public which contributes funds to sup-
port medical research is entitled to be kept up to date on new de-
velopments.92 However, medical researchers can and should exer-
cise restraint in releasing information about new and unproven
techniques. 3 Because of the obvious conflict between this right
to know and the freedom of the press to provide information on
one side and the rights of the patient, his family, and the surgeon
to privacy on the other side, some compromise is necessary. It
would be difficult to legislate solutions to this problem, and by the
time such legislation could be made effective, the need would prob-
ably be over. It seems best to permit these problems to be adjusted
by the doctors and the news media, and indications are that the
problem is being recognized and attacked in this way. 4
III. CONCLUSION
Heart transplantation, at its present low level of sophistication,
is merely a promising method of treatment for use in some situa-
tions.95 The development of this technique should be encouraged
and ways must be found to make certain that it is used wisely.
WILBUR C. LEATHERBERRY
92 Id. at 30.
93 Dr. Irvine Page has urged medical researchers to restrain themselves with respect
to announcements about the prospects for their new and unproven techniques. Page,
supra note 65. Dr. Donald Effler expressed similar views in a letter to the Saturday
Review. SATURDAY RiV., Feb. 3, 1968, at 64 (letter to the editor).
94 SATURDAY REv., Feb. 3, 1968, at 64 (letter to the editor).
95 Lear, supra note 62, at 54.
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